A filosofia não deveria se preocupar com nada prático. Pois, a prática está saturada de senso comum.
Se a filosofia conseguir discursar acerca de uma prática totalmente despida das confusões do senso comum, então poderá, talvez, ter algum êxito em sua abordagem.
A considerable and laudatory comment about Christianity is discoursed by Kant in the pamphlet The End of All Things, where our philosopher says that this religious following has even itself something worthy of love.
Kant not only approach the Christianity of the claims of the law, as reinterpreted in the light of his moral doctrine with regard to the aspirations of the law as to what is prescribed for reward purposes or punishment data as necessary compliances retributive the actions of rational beings .
Um
considerável e elogioso comentário sobre o cristianismo é discorrido por Kant
no opúsculo O Fim de Todas as Coisas,
onde nosso filósofo afirma que este seguimento religioso tem ainda em si algo digno de amor[1].
Kant não só aproxima o cristianismo
das pretensões da lei, como o reinterpreta à luz de sua doutrina moral no que
se refere às aspirações da lei, quanto ao que esta prescreve para fins de
recompensa ou punição dados como conformidades necessárias retributivas às
ações dos seres racionais.
[1] KANT, I. O Fim de Todas as Coisas. Tradução de Artur Mourão.
www.lusofia.net. P. 13
Em suma, Kant define
milagre como um termo aplicado aos acontecimentos
no mundo de cuja causa nos sãos e hão-de permanecer de todo desconhecidas as
leis de acção (KANT, 1992, p. 92),
isto é, são fatos inexplicáveis, ignorados pelo uso prático da razão[1]. Há,
portanto, leis conhecidas ou conhecíveis à cognição da razão, porém, quando nos
referimos a milagres, estamos contando com leis de todo incompreensíveis para
nós, das quais desconhecemos e devemos continuar as ignorando.
[1] Aquele uso extensivo e ampliador
do conhecimento capaz de ir além da mera razão pura.
In Two Dogmas of Empiricism Quine presents at first the problem as the division that is usually made between synthetic and analytic propositions. For him, there are no boundaries between analytic and synthetic statements.
The difference between meaning and name
x name meaning
<Concretes
Singular terms <
<Abstract
The Singular terms are those that name the entities
Term = General Predicate
The General Terms are the truth about the entity
There is therefore a difference between the meaning of the singular term and a named entity.
Also, the meaning of a general term is different from your extension.
Quine addresses the issue of "be contained in" concepts
MEANING
What is the meaning?
We can understand that a first feature of significance is that it is not a name.
Hence, "the meaning is that it becomes the essence when it is divorced from the reference object and joins the word."
Meaning Theory x Reference Theory
In this sense, the meaning is closer to the floor than to the reference object, the same object.
From this it follows that for the study theory of the significance is necessary to understand two modes:
<Synonymy (occurs replacement by synonyms)
meaning <
<analyticity
Quine claims that a logical truth "is a statement that is true and remains true in all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles."
<Logically true (ex .: no unmarried man is married)
Analytic statements <
<Synonymy (eg .: No bachelor is married)
Thus, the challenge raised by Quine in this writing is what relates to analyticity under synonymy therefore generally said that analytic statements of the second class (synonyms) are mere explanations of the first class (logical truths).
The Definition of the Problem
The first problem of synonymy is placed as the issue of definition, since the analytic statements of the second class, namely the synonymic, reduce to define or seek to explain the logical truths, such as "single" (logical truth ) and "unmarried man" (synonym). With it, Quine raises the question of the origin of the definition of what comprises the lexcógrafo function to base its records with the usual sense of the language, that is, according to the behavior and linguistic dynamics.
Quine concludes that although we do not know what is the reason of having synonyms, they are based on interconnections based on usage.
Consequently Quine reminds negatively the question of explanation raised by Carnap, where it occurs, to explain an extension of the sense of the definition, no longer as mere synonym of the first utterances, but a refinement of meaning. For to Quine, although there is not a direct synonymy, the explanation just by borrowing other synonyms.
Quine concludes that the definition does not solve the problem of synonymy.
The Problem of Intersubstituitibilidade
Point 3 addresses the issue of intersubstitutibilidade when two linguistic forms are intersubstituem whatever the context. The Quine this perspective also terce criticism and counter-claims saying that not in all contexts can substitute a synonym for another.
